In contrast to the man's notion of morality -as "having a reason," "a way y of knowing what's right, what one ought to do" -is the woman's sense of morality as a type of "consciousness," "a sensitivity" incorporating an injunction not to endanger or hurt other people. In the first image of an individual ~lone deciding what ought to be done, morality becomes a discrete moment of rational "choosing." In the second image, of an individual aware, connected, and attending to others, morality becomes a "type of consciousness" which, although rooted in time, is not bound by the single moment. Thus, two distinct ways of making moral choices are revealed.
The representation in psychological theory of these two different images and ideas of making moral choices is the concern of this paper. One view has come to dominate modern moral psychology-the image of the person in a discrete moment of individual choice. The identification of a second image-the individual connected and attending to others-and the systematic description of both views from empirical data are presented in this work. In her critique of moral philosophy, Murdoch (1970) , the British novelist and philosopher, indicates the importance of this investigation. She elaborates two issues raised by this second image of the self which apply as well to moral psychology: the need for a conception of self not limited to that of a rational, choosing agent, and a concern for acknowledging a conception of love as central to people and to moral theory.
Describing present-day moral philosophy as "confused," "discredited," and "regarded as unnecessary," Murdoch focuses on philosophy's idea and image of the self. Believing that modern moral philosophy has been "dismantling the old substantial picture of the self," Murdoch sees the moral agent reduced to an "isolated principle of will or burrowing point of consciousness." The self as moral agent, "thin as a needle, appears only in the quick flash of the choosing will" (pp. 47, 53). Murdoch rejects this classic Kantian image of the self as pure, rational agent. For her, moral choice is "as often a mysterious matter, because, what we really are seems much more like an obscure system of energy out of which choices and visible acts of will emerge at intervals in ways that are often unclear and often dependent on the condition of the system in between the moments of choice" (p. 54).
The picture of the self as ever capable of detached objectivity in situations of human choice is thus rejected by Murdoch. Yet this is the image assumed in Kohlberg's (1969 Kohlberg's ( , 1981 model of moral development. That model, which is a hierarchically ordered sequence of stages of moral judgment-making based in part on the pioneering work of Piaget (1932 Piaget ( / 1966 , is the dominant model of modern moral psychology. In addition, Murdoch's challenge to philosophy "that we need a moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now ... can once again be made central," can also be directed to moral psychology (1970, P: 46) . Murdoch's assumption is that love is a central fact of people's everyday lives and morality. But modern moral psychology, grounded in the concepts of justice and rights, subsumes any notion of care or concern for another we might call love. It was Gilligan (1977) who first revealed this distortion of moral psychological theory. Gilligan (1977 Gilligan ( , 1982 , listening to women's discussions of their own real-life moral conflicts, recognized a conception of morality not represented in Kohlberg's work. To her, women's concerns centered on care and response to others. Noting too that women often felt caught between caring for themselves and caring for others, and characterized their failures to care as failures to be "good" women, Gilligan suggested that conceptions of self and morality might be intricately linked. In sum, Gilligan hypothesized (I) that there are two distinct modes of moral judgment-justice and care-in the thinking of men and women; (?-)that these are gender-related; and (3) that modes of moral judg· ment might be related to modes of self-definition.
The research described here includes the first systematic, empirical test of these hypotheses. This paper reports on the identification, exploration, and description from data of two views of the self and two ways of making moral choices. The translation of these ideas into a methodology made possible the testing of Gilligan's hypotheses.
The empirical data consist of responses of thirty-six individuals to questions asked in open-ended interviews designed to draw out an individual's conception of self and orientation to morality. The data were analyzed first for descriptions of self, then for considerations individuals presented from their own real-life moral conflicts, and finally for correlations between the two.
The first part of this article presents interview data on ways that individual males and females-children, adolescents, and adults-describe themselves. These data reveal two characteristic modes of describing the self-in-relation-to-others: a self separate or objective in its relations to others and a self connected or interdependent in its relations' to others. Then, from individuals' discussions of their own real-life moral conflicts, two w,ays of considering moral issues are distinguished: a morality of rights and justice and a morality of response and care. These data are then used to develop two coding schemes, methodologies for systematically and reliably identifying peoples' modes of self-definition and bases of moral choice. Finally, results of the study designed to test Gilligan's hypotheses and a discussion of the implications of this work for psychological theory and practice are presented. Thus, this article moves between the discursive essay and the reo search report, to show the evolution of a conceptual framework based on peoples' reallife experiences, and the translation of that framework into a systematic methodology for analyzing data and testing hypotheses:' A social dimension emerges as' central in this work: in each of the two images of people making moral choices, there is a distinct way of seeing and being in relation to others. Although Kohlberg has identified a developmental pattern of a morality of justice, he has not elaborated the connection between his conceptualization of moral development and an understanding of relationships. Because this present work assumes that an understanding of relationships is central to a conception of morality, it is not directly parallel to Kohlberg's, yet it does maintain an indebtedness to it." Gilligan and her associates (Gilligan, 1977 (Gilligan, , 1982 Langdale & Gilligan, Note 1; Lyons, Notes 2,3) have outlined, but only broadly, the developmental patterns of an orientation to care. What remains then is the task of examining the developmental patterns of a morality of justice and of care within a framework of relationships. This present work supports, modifies, and elaborates Gilligan's ideas and confirms Piaget's central insight that "apart from our relations to other people, there can be no moral necessity" (Piaget, 1932 (Piaget, /1966 . , Kohlberg's coding scheme focuses on analyzing moral judgments. It does not analyze the construction, resolution, and evaluation of moral choices, or considerations other than judgments in the resolution of conflict. In addition, it does not deal with real-life data, focusing instead on hypothetical moral dilemma data.
127
.,
Data
When asked to talk about themselves, individuals differ in how they describe themselves in relation to others.. Because these differences. Became central to the construction of the coding schemes for identifying modes of self-definition and moral choice, it is useful to look closely at the differences in the responses of adolescents, children, and adults. These data reveal two distinct conceptions of relationships, each characterized by a unique perspective toward others.
For two fourteen-year-olds taking part in an open-ended interview, the question was the same: "How would you describe yourself to yourself?" Jack begins:
What I am? (pause) That's a hard one ... Well, I ski-I think I'm a pretty good skier. And basketball, I think I'm a pretty good basketball player. I'm a good runner ... and I think I'm pretty smart. My grades are good ... I get along with a lot of people and teachers. And ... I'm not too fussy, I don't think-easy to satisfy, usually-depending on what it is.
Presenting ways by which he evaluates himself, Jack comments on how he measures up in terms of some ranking of abilities: good skier, basketball player, runner, pretty smart. Talking about his relations with others, Jack continues to focus on his abilities: "I get along with a lot of people and teachers."
Fourteen-year-old Beth's response begins as Jack's did with the activities that engage her; however, she then tells of the network of relations that connect her to others:
I like to do a lot of things. I like to do activities and ski and stuff. I like people. I like little kids and babies. And I like older people, too, like grandparents and everything; they're real special and stuff. I don't know, I guess I'd say I like myself. I have a lot of stuff going on. I have a lot of friends in the neighborhood. And I laugh a lot.
The interviewer asks, "Why do you like yourself?" and Beth replies: I don't know. I think it's the surroundings around me that make my life pretty good. And I have a nice neighborhood and a lot of nice friends and older people .... We visit new people everywhere we go. And there's my grandmother, and every time I go to my grandmother's, she makes me see all her friends and stuff. And I think that helps me along the line, 'cause you get to know them, and it makes you more friendly.
The contrast between these two responses may not at first glance seem striking, but there is a difference between the images and ideas of each person's relationships to others. Jack connects himself to others through his abilities. Like his ranking of himself as a "pretty good skier" and a "good runner," Jack's way of relating to others is another measure of his abilities: "I get along with a lot of people and teachers." Jack's perspective toward others is in his own terms, through the self's "I." Beth's connection to others is through the people who make up her "surroundings" -nice friends, older people, little kids, and babies. Her connections through others are in turn to others: "My grandmother ... she makes me see all her friends and stuff." Thus, Beth's perspective towards others is to see them in their own terms. She sees, for example, her grandmother with her own friends, in her own context. Further, Beth seems to see a circle of interdependence in these relationships: "And I think that helps me along the line, 'Cause you get to know them, and it makes you more friendly." Although both young people discuss re-lational topics that sound similar, they reflect different perspectives towards others: seeing others in their own terms, or through the self's perspective.
These different ways of seeing others also emerge in individuals' considerations when talking about moral conflict.-When asked, "Have you ever been in a situation where you had to make a decision about what was right but you weren't sure what to do?" Jack relates an experience of being with a group of his peers who wanted to wax windows on Halloween. To an earlier question, "What makes something a moral problem?" Jack had replied, "Somewhere I have to decide ... whether I should do this or not ... whether it's right that (should do something or whether it's wrong." Now, talking about his conflicts about that Halloween, he echoes the earlier response: .. I knew it wasn't right, but they, the kids, they would think, 'Oh, he's no fun, he doesn't want to do it, he's afraid he's going to get in trouble,' stuff like that." Urged by the interviewer to describe the consequences he considered when making his decision, Jack mentions "getting in trouble, ' .... my mother and father would have been upset by something like that-they wouldn't like it," and "if I didn't go, some of my friends would think ... 'Well, he's no fun'." Jack also describes his major consideration in making a decision: "Well, you have to think about what would be right ... and then ... are you gonna stand up for what's right and wrong to your friends, or are you gonna let them -get you into going." Revealing that in the end he didn't go with his friends, he elaborates why: .. I didn't think it was right ... and if somebody wanted to wax my windows, (wouldn't like it, so I wasn't going to do that to someone else."
Through reciprocity Jack resolves this moral conflict. Asked if he had made the right decision, Jack replies, "Well ... my parents would have been pleased that I had not gone .... If the kids had gotten into trouble, (would have known that I made the right decision, 'cause I wouldn't have wanted to have been in that group." When challenged, "What if no one knew about it?" Jack resorts again to his "principle" for choice: "I don't think you could think that was the right decision if you were to do that -to wax somebody's windows and go away thinking that was 'the right thing to do." For Jack, the moral problem hinges on knowing what is right and acting on that in spite of pressures or taunts from his friends. Solving the problem, then, becomes a matter of thinking about what would be right and standing up to that. His reciprocity-based justification is derived from the self's perspective: "If somebody wanted to wax my windows, (wouldn't like it, so (wasn't going to do that to someone else." Like the measure of self-in-relation-to-others found in his self-description, Jack sees and resolves moral conflict through the self's perspective.
Beth's moral problem arises from a different set of concerns as well as a different perspective towards others. First she narrates the events surrounding her conflict: "I had a decision to give up my paper route. And I had a decision over two people, like two people wanted it. And I didn't know what was the right decision." Asked to describe the conflicts for her in that situation, she says: "Well, some friends of the person that I said could not have the route were going against me and saying that, you know, 'You did it' and 'What a stupid thing to do, to give it to the other person.' The person got kinda upset, and kinda turned against me."
Reconstructing how she thought through the problem, Beth illuminates her way of thinking in choice:
129 " [at first] I was trying to think mostly who I thought was going to do better at it. I don't know, it kinda got me all upset because I didn't want to hurt somebody, one person's feelings by telling them they couldn't have it. And going to the other person and sa ying you can. I think that's mostly what bothered me .... And then it bothered me more when I thought of what person was mostly gonna get it, I was thinking, well, are they really gonna do a good job? .. I didn't want anybody doing it that was gonna be nasty to anybody. Because I have some older people that I do on the route, and they like to talk to you and everything. And I didn't want to give it to anybody that was gonna walk away. I wanted them to get along .... I didn't want anybody getting in fights or anything.
As she envisions the elderly people on her paper route, Beth's decision turns on her considerations of their needs. The moral problem at first hinges on seeing the possible fractures between people and trying to avert them, Caught between wanting someone good for the paper route job and not wanting to hurt the person she had to turn down, Beth's concerns for relationships and for the welfare of others conflict.
Asked, "How did you know that it was the right decision?" Beth tells us how things worked out: "The person that was bad for the job finally realized that the person [ chosen] was going to be a good person to do it." She also describes how she evaluates the decision: "I told my friends about it and my parents, and they said, 'Yeah.' And I told my paper route people that there was gonna be a new person, and they said 'Yeah,' they liked that person. And so I thought, 'Well, I think I did a pretty good job, if everybody's happy'." Beth measures the rightness of her choice by how things worked out. Having told her friends, parents, and "my paper route people," and having their concurrence, she finds in the restoration of relationships the validation of her choice.
Although Jack and Beth both wrestle with issues raised by friendships, two different kinds of moral problems concern them. Through two different perspectives-the perspective of self or the perspective of others-different problems arise and different resolutions are sought. These distinctions are found in data from younger children and adults as well.
Two eight-year-olds are asked, "How would you describe yourself to yourself?" Jeffrey answers in the third person, saying that "he's got blond hair" and "has a hard time going to sleep." He also focuses on abilities: "He learns how to do things; when he thinks they're going to be hard, he learns how to do them." Describing his way of relating to others, Jeffrey says, "He bugs everybody and he fights everybody," concluding with, "That's it. I'm lazy."
To the interviewer's question, eight-year-old Karen replies in the first person, "I don't know. I do a lot of things. I like a lot of things." Adding, "I get mad not too easy," she comments that she has "made a lot of new friends" and concludes, "And, urn, I don't know if everyone thinks this, but I think I tell the truth most of the time."
Echoing themes of Jack, the adolescent, Jeffrey presents a measure of himself by abilities: "He learns how to do things; when he thinks they're going to be hard, he learns how to do things." Karen's observation that she has "made a lot of new friends" echoes adolescent Beth's self-description of her connection to the people surrounding her. It is in contrast to Jeffrey's "he bugs everybody and he fights everybody."
Themes in the real-life conflicts which the children report repeat those of the adolescents. Jeffrey talks with the interviewer about a real-life conflict. "Like when I really 
Why is it hard to figure it out?
'Cause you haven't thought about it that much.
So what do you do in a situation like that?
Just figure it out, and do the right thing that I should do.
And how do you know what you should do?
'Ca'use when you think about it a lot, then you know the right thing to do first.
How do you know it's the right thing?
'Cause you've been thinking about it a lot.
Can you tell me how you think about it?
It's really simple if you think about it real quick. I think about my friends and then I think about my mother. And then I think about the right thing to do.
To the interviewer's question, "But how do you know it's the right thing to do?" Jeffrey concludes, "Because usually different things go before other things. Because your mother-even though she might ask you second -it's in your house." For Jeffrey, having a rule -"different things go before other things" -allows him to resolve the dilemma of choice. Like Jack's use of the Golden Rule, Jeffrey finds a resolution to his conflict in the rule of "some things go first." For both Jack and Jeffrey it is through the self's perspective -the self's rule or standard -that moral conflict is cast and resolved.
Different issues concern eight-year-old Karen. She describes conflicts with friends: "I have a lot of friends and I can't always play with all of them, so I have to take turns. Like, they get mad sometimes when I can't play with them. And then that's how it all starts." Asked what kinds of things she considers when trying to decide with whom to play.. Karen replies, "Um, someone all alone, loneliness. Um, even if they are not my friends, not my real friends, I play with them anyways because not too many people do that. ... They never think of the right person."
Describing the "right person" as someone who is "quiet who ... doesn't talk too much, who doesn't have any brothers or sisters," Karen, like Beth, tries to connect people to one another, "to make them feel more like at home." Asked to elaborate, Karen responds: "If a person's all alone ... if that person never has anyone to talk to or any· thing ... they are never going to have any friends. Like when they get older they are gonna have to talk. And if they never talk or anything, then nobody's going to know them .... If that person always stays alone, she's not going to have any fun."
For Karen, as for Beth, moral conflicts arise from having to maintain connections between people, not wanting people to be isolated, alone, or hurt. For both, resolutions are found by considering the needs of those involved. Like their adolescent counterparts, these two eight-year-olds reflect different perspectives towards others. They see and attend to different things.
These distinguishing characteristics and different ways of seeing others are manifest in adulthood. John, the thirty-six-year-old professional educator quoted at the begin-ning of this paper, reveals a "logic" consistent with that of Jack and Jeffrey. He describes the decision to fire a colleague as a personal moral conflict. Although believing that the firing breached a prior agreement, he describes his conflict as "lack of confidence. in my own judgment ... feeling like maybe the others were right." His co-workers had decided, after the deadline, to fire the staff member. Describing how he felt in trying to think about what to do, he says: "I felt I had a commitment to live with ... [we] all had a commitment to honor. ... But for me it was a serious matter of principles."
Later, reflecting on his decision to offer his resignation in protest, he comments on how he thought about the decision:
Well, I guess I will never know for sure ... but I am comfortable with it, in the sense that given the pressures, and given the fact I had to decide and I don't feel I perverted any principle I hold now in making that decision. For me it was a test, in a way it became a symbol, because all this had been weighing on me. In a way the principle was commitment to principle, and I had to decide whether I had it or not, and if I let it go by, then maybe I didn't have the right to ever challenge anybody else.
In childhood and adulthood, a line of thinking in moral choice is revealed in the conflicts expressed by Jack, Jeffrey, and John in which issues of morality hinge on "moments of choice" and "knowing how to decide," thus conjuring up Murdoch's image of the self in the "quick flash of the choosing will."
Answering the question, "How would you describe yourself to yourself?" John goes on to talk explicitly about his own perspective towards others. He acknowledges: "I happen to be a person who likes the world of ideas," who can "delight myself for hours on end reading and thinking, puzzling over things .... I am not the sort of person who has a natural outreaching towards other people. That for me is always sort of an effort ... an effort that I need to be nudged to do." Suggesting the importance of relationships to him, he continues talking about their difficulties and rewards for him personally:
I am nudged [towards others] in several ways-by other people…'but also by my con-: victions that tell me that I have responsibilities' to other people: , and, once nudged though, the interesting thing is that it is always rewarding. And I am grateful because most of-the personal growth I have gone through has been through these other people and not through thinking about the world of ideas and that sort of stuff. But somehow I always retreat into the corner and want to be off by myself. It is a paradox about me, one that I still haven't fully understood. , .. Gregarious people I think can't fully understand sometimes how hard it is for certain people to become involved with people because what they regard as either minor personal risks or non-risks altogether, can strike a person like me sometimes as insurmountable obstacles. So that is one aspect of myself that just happens to come to mind. This is interesting because I had never thought about this much.
John picks up the themes of relating to others from the self's perspective heard earlier in the responses of Jack and Jeffrey. So, too, an adult woman repeats themes found in the concerns of Karen and Beth.
Forty-six-year-old Sarah, a lawyer, who describes herself as "perceptive" and "responsive" to others, tells about a moral dilemma she faced. She discovered in the course of a contested custody case that her client's boyfriend was an illegal alien. Although withholding this information was not technically illegal, she sensed that the information could affect the judge's ruling. She asked herself if telling would really make a difference in the long run and decided that it would not, "that it would resolve itself one way or the other." She concludes, "nobody is getting particularly hurt by this." Talking about her dilemma in a larger context, she describes the conflict her role creates:
I think that I run into a dilemma in doing domestic relations work in the sense that I am dealing with a legal system that is dealing with something that it doesn't know how to deal with very well and I get very distressed because it is hard for me to put together exactly what my role is supposed to be ... you are presiding over some pretty emotional rnoments in people's lives, and I never know whether I should be sort of, here is the lawbook, and not do anything to try to do whatever kind of counseling, whatever kind of support one might provide for people without costing them a fortune .... On the other hand, I think people need something like this. I end up in a dilemma in dealing with custody decisions, which are very messy. And God knows, there is no right and no wrong. It is a question of how can you work out something that is going to be the least painful altern arive for all the people involved ....
The ultimate principle for resolving moral conflict, for Sarah, seems to be to work out "the least painful alternative for all the people involved."
From these examples, we see that individuals describe different kinds of considerations in moral choice tied to different ways of being with, and seeing, others: to treat others as you would like to be treated or to work out something that is "the least painful alternative for all involved." To treat others as you would be treated demands distance and objectivity. It requires disengaging oneself from a situation to ensure that each per· son is treated equally. In contrast; to work out the least painful alternative for all those involved means to see the situation in its context, to work within an existential reality and ensure that all persons are understood in their own terms. These two ways of per· ceiving others and being in relation to them are thus central both to a way of describing the self and to thinking in moral choice.
Development of the Coding Schemes
When moving from data to the conceptual constructs on which a coding scheme is based, a circular interaction occurs: the data account for the constructs and are in turn explained by them. Indeed, as Loevinger (1979) argues, such circularity is necessary to validate the coding schemes and to build the theory of which they are a part. This interactive process is described below to illuminate how ideas about human relationships, identified first in the statements of individuals, were translated into systematic categories of a coding scheme, a methodology for analyzing data.
Many researchers (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Erikson, 1968; Freud, 1925 Freud, /1961 Piaget, 193211966) have commented on the relational bias of women's conceptions of self and morality. But it was Gilligan (1977) who first suggested that this relational bias might represent a unique construction of social reality. The study discussed below, designed by Gilligan, hypothesized that men and women do think differently about themselves in relation to others. That there is such a difference was supported in an examination of data-such as the comments of those quoted above-and then elaborated conceptually on the basis of that data. In that process two different ideas and ways of experiencing human relationships were revealed that seemed tied to two characteristic ways of seeing others. This distinction was then 133 " conceptualized as two perspectives towards others. Table 1 presents schematically the two modes of being-in-relation-to-others, separate/objective and connected, and their respective perspective towards others, reciprocity or response.
Each of these two ideas of relationships with their characteristic perspective towards others implies a set of related ideas. The perspective of the separate/objective self -labeled "reciprocity" -is based on impartiality, objectivity, and the distancing of the self from others. It assumes an ideal relationship of equality. When this is impossible, given the various kinds of obligatory role relationships and the sometimes conflicting claims of individuals in relationships, the best recourse is to fairness as an approximation of equality. This requires the maintenance of distance between oneself and others to allow for the impartial mediation of relationships. To consider others in reciprocity implies considering their situations as if one were in them oneself. Thus, an assumption of this perspective is that others are the same as the self.
The perspective of the connected self-labeled "response" -is based on interdependence and concern for another's well-being. It assumes an ideal relationship of care and responsiveness to others. Relationships can best be maintained and sustained by consid- aRelationships --the ways of being with or towards others that all individuals experience but that may be understood in either of two ways.
ering others in their specific contexts and not always invoking strict equality. 3 To be reo sponsive requires seeing others in their own terms, entering into the situations of others in order to know them as the others do, that is, to try to understand how they see their situations. Thus, an assumption of this perspective is that others are different from oneself.
In Table 2 the relationship between these conceptions of self and orientations to morality, as they emerged from the empirical data, are presented schematically. The data revealed that separate/ objective individuals tend to use a morality of "justice," while connected individuals use a morality of "care."
The conceptions of morality and the perspectives towards others are constructs, and as such represent ideals containing strengths and weaknesses. Equality is an ideal and a strength of a morality of justice; the consideration of individuals' particular needs -in their own terms-is both an ideal and a strength of a morality of care. On the other hand, an impartial concern for others' rights may not be sufficient to provide for care, and caring for others may leave individuals uncaring of their own needs and rights to care for themselves. In addition, the response perspective may suggest an unqualified and overly emotional concern for meeting the needs of others.' However, the present research suggests a greater complexity of meaning. Response to another is an interactive process in which a developing and changing individual views others as also changing across the life cycle.
Within most psychological models the ability to see another's perspective is considered a cognitive capacity which gradually becomes more objective and abstract (Kohlberg, 1969 (Kohlberg, , 1981 Mead, 1934; Selman, (980) . In contrast, the perspective of response described here emphasizes the particular and the concrete. While it is assumed that this perspective changes over the course of development, the nature of these changes is not yet known. It may be that in "maturity" one generalizes the particular, that is, one always looks at the particular, and this is the general principle. This research suggests that our current unitary models of perspective-taking may need revision. Perspective-taking and a "perspective-towards-others" conceptualized here are separate phenomena.
It is important also that the use of the word "response" or "reciprocity" in subjects' re-, A fourteen-year-old girl suggested the subtlety of the process of considering others in their terms. Asked by the interviewer, in response to a comment she had made, "How do you think about what someone else's reaction is going to be?" she says: "Well, first I look at the person and I think about what they are like and how they have reacted in similar situations and how they react in general and, then, I put myself away from that person and say, This is how they would react probably in this situation.' " Asked, "What do you mean when you put yourself away from another person?" she replies, "Urn -(pause) I guess maybe I don't put myself away from them. more the opposite. I put myself in that person and try to put together a way that they would feel about this and this and this with the ideas that I have." She continues her explanation, "I guess I put myself away from me for a minute, put myself in their-but I am not relating myself to the subject at all, I am not relating the way that I feel about it, what's important to me-to what I let them think, to what I think that they'll feel." This interview is from a study of adolescent girls currently being conducted with Carol Gilligan at the Emma Willard School (Troy, New York) through the support of the Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation and with the collaboration of Robert Parker, Principal, Trudy Hammer, Associate Principal, and the students and staff.
• In considering the "emotional aspect of concern for another," it is useful to note Blum's work, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (1980) . Blum argues for a second mode of morality concerned with the good of the other and challenges the dominant Kantian view to argue that altruistic concerns and emotions can be morally good. The work presented here assumes Blum's philosophical argument and demonstrates empirically the psychological phenomenon that individuals do act out of concern for the good of another. sponses not be assumed to indicate automatically the possession of that particular perspective on morality or relationships. For example, an individual using a morality of justice and having a perspective of reciprocity might state, as did fourteen -year-old Jack, .. I would not do that because I would not like someone to do that to me. .. However, an indi-
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" vidual using a morality of care and having a perspective of response might use the word "reciprocity" but with a different meaning. "I want to reciprocate because they will need that kind of help and [will be able to do that for them.' In a perspective of response, the focus is always on the needs of others; it is the welfare or well-being of others in their terms that is important, not strictly what others might do in return or what the principle of fairness might demand or allow.' What follows from these distinctions is that the language of morality must always be scrutinized for differences in underlying meaning. For example, words like "obligation" or "responsibility" cannot be taken at face value. (The moral imperatives of what one is "obliged" to do, "should" do, or what "responsibilities" one has are, in fact, shaped by one's perspective towards others.)
Research is needed to elaborate the conceptualizations presented here-of two perspectives on self, relationship, and morality-across the life cycle, especially attending to the issues of change and development. Research should also address potential interactions, that is, ways in which one orientation to morality may affect or be affected by the other." In addition, individuals' understanding and awareness of their own perspectives of themselves-in-relation-to-others needs to be elaborated. The work presented here shows how the logic of each mode of morality and self-description has been elicited from interview data. The next section will describe how that logic was captured in a methodology, that is, in two coding schemes and used to test a set of hypotheses.
An Empirical Study Testing Gilligan's Hypotheses
In this empirical study," male and female subjects were interviewed in order to ascertain their modes of self-definition and of moral choice, and to explore the connection between self-definition and modes of moral choice. A wider age-range was sampled to help elaborate modes of moral choice and of self-definition previously observed by Gilligan (1977) in a narrower age span of women. Both-men and women were included to • "Response" is an ancient word in English meaning "an answer, a reply; an action or feeling which answers to some stimulus or influence." "Responsibility" -usually associated with moral accountability and obligation and most frequently with contractual agreements related to a morality of justice -itself carried in its earliest meaning "answering to something." It was only in the nineteenth century that "responsibility" became attached to moral accountability and rational conduct. (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v, "response," "responsibility. ") . For a useful discussion of "responsibility" as a new symbol and image in ethics, see Niebuhr's The Responsible Self (196!1) . Niebuhr makes the interesting argument that "responsibility" as a new image of man -"man the answerer, man engaged in dialogue ... acting in response to action upon him" -when used of the self as agent, as doer "is usually translated with the aid of older images [of man 1 as meaning directed toward goals or as ability to be moved by respect for the law." Further, Niebuhr says, "the understanding of ourselves as responsive beings who in all our actions answer to action upon us in accordance with our interpretation of such actions is a fruitful conception, which brings into view aspects of our self-defining conduct that are obscured when the older images are exclusively employed" ( P: 57). Niebuhr's point is relevant to the argument here. The meaning of "responsibility" in its sense of "responsiveness" is, or may be, obscured by teleological or deontological conceptions of morality.
• This interaction is not to be confused with the fact that an individual with a major, or predominant, orientation may call upon considerations within either orientation when dealing with moral choice. But how a ma· jor orientation is influenced by the other, or minor, mode in its own sequence of development has not yet been elaborated and requires future work.
avoid the bias of a single-sex sample and to allow for the exploration of both justice and care orientations across the life-cycle. If-as Gilligan suggested -the absence of women subjects in past research obscured an understanding of the morality of care, the inclusion of men and women 'with in this study may reveal its complexity for both sexes.
A secondary purpose of the study was to explore a suggestion of Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) that when women are engaged professionally outside the home and occupy equivalent educational and social positions as do men, they will reach higher stages of moral development than the typical adult women's stage (stage three-interpersonal mode) of his six stage system of moral judgment-making. Therefore, a sample of professional women was essential. It was also expected that such a sample would provide evidence concerning Gilligan's hypothesis that women consistently demonstrate a morality of care regardless of their profession.
Sample. The sample of thirty-six people consisted of two males and two females at each of the following ages: 8, 11, 14-15, 19, 22, 27, 36, 45 , and 60-plus years. The sample was identified through personal contact and recommendation, and all subjects referred met the sampling criteria of high levels of intelligence, education, and social class.
Procedure. The data were collected in a five-part, open-ended interview which was conducted in a clinical manner, a method derived from Piaget (1929 Piaget ( /1976 . The interview proceeds from structured questions to a more unstructured exploration and clarification of each person's response. (See Appendix A for interview schedule.) Interview questions were developed to illuminate how the individual constructs his or her own reality and meaning, in this case, the experience of self and the domain of morality.
Data Analysis. The data were analyzed first for modes of self-definition, then for the subjects' orientations within considerations-of real-life moral conflicts. Finally, they were analyzed for correlations between the two (Lyons, 1982 , Note 3).
Considerations of justice or Care in Moral Conflicts
By examining the considerations individuals present in the 'construction. resolution; and evaluation of real-life moral dilemmas, the relative predominance of justice or care orientations to morality was determined. Considerations were categorized as either response (care) or rights (justice) (see Coding Scheme, Appendix B), and scored by counting the number of considerations each individual presented within either mode. In addition to identifying the presence of justice or care considerations, predominance of mode within this scoring system was determined by the higher frequency of one or the other mode in a subject's responses. Results were also expressed as percentages indicating the relationship of the dominant mode to all considerations the individual gave.
Intercoder reliability was established by two additional coders for both identification of considerations within real-life dilemmas (Step 1) and categorization of considerations as belonging to response or rights modes within the subjects' construction, resolution, and evaluation of their moral conflict (Step 2). Agreements for Step 1 were 75 and 76 percent, for
Step 2, 84 and 78 percent. Table 3 summarizes the predominance of response and rights considerations in reallife moral dilemmas for both males and females. The table shows that in real-life con- "Io(N) o (0) 7 (1) Note: x'(2) = 11.63 P < .001 fliers, while women use considerations of response more frequently than rights and men use considerations of rights more frequently than response, in some instances the reverse is true. Table 4 illustrates this pattern in another way, indicating that all the females in this sample presented considerations of response, but 37 percent (6) failed to mention any considerations of rights. Similarly, all the males presented considerations of rights, but 36 percent (6) failed to mention any considerations of response. These findings show that, in real-life moral conflict, individuals in this sample call upon and think about both care and justice considerations but use predominantly one mode which is related to but not defined or confined to an individual by virtue of gender. Although this study did not specifically consider developmental changes in moral thinking and self-definition, some results suggest possible developmental issues. It is clear that considerations of both response and rights are found across the life cycle. However, after age 27, women show increased consideration of rights in their conceptualization of moral problems or conflict, although they still use considerations of response more frequently than rights in the resolution of conflict. This may be related to a second finding: the disappearance of the response consideration of "care of the self" at the same age. These findings suggest the possibility of an interaction between the rights and response orientations for women in their late twenties. Another finding with implications for developmental change is the greater persistence of considerations of response among male adolescents. In general, however, across the life cycle men's considerations of rights maintain greater consistency than do women's considerations of response. Taken
139
., together, these findings suggest separate developmental shifts for men and women which deserve further study.
Keeping in mind that the sample is small (N = 36), the results reported here support the hypothesis that there are two different orientations to morality -an orientation towards rights and justice, and an orientation towards care and response to others in their own terms. Morality is not unitarily justice and rights, nor are these orientations mutually exclusive: individuals use both kinds of considerations in the construction, resolution, and evaluation of real-life moral conflicts, but usually one mode predominantly. This finding of gender-related differences, however, is not absolute since individual men and women ·use both types of considerations.
Modes of Self-Definition: Separate/Objective OT Connected
This study also tested the hypothesis that individuals use two distinct modes of self-definition. Respondents were asked "How would you describe yourself to yourself?" and responses were analyzed to determine the predominance of one of two modes of self-definition -separate/ objective or connected. In a manner similar to that used for the analysis of the moral conflicts data, these self-descriptive responses were categorized according to four components: general and factual; abilities and agency; psychological; and relational (see Coding Scheme, Appendix C). Each individual was scored by counting the number of separate/objective or connected relational characterizations, and then the predominant mode was determined.
Intercoder reliability for the self-description data was established using two independent coders in a two-step coding process which was more rigorous than most correlational reliability procedures. Every statement about self-definition was coded. In Step I, in which each idea about the self was identified, intercoder reliability was 70 and 71 percent. In Step 2, in which each idea was categorized according to specific aspects within components, intercoder reliability was 74 and 82 percent.
A summary of male and female modes.ofself-definition.is given in Table 5 : As the table indicates, women more frequently use characterizations of a connected self, while men more frequently use characterizations of a separate/ objective self. Although these different gender-related modalities occur systematically across the life-cycle, they are not absolute; some women and some men define themselves with elements of either mode, In addition, and perhaps most striking, is the finding that both men and women define themselves in relation to others with equal frequency, although their characterizations of these relationships are different. Note: x'(3) = 16.3 P < .001
Relationship of Definitions of Self to Considerations in Real-Life Moral Choice
Some of the most important results of this study concern the testing of the hypothesis of the relationship between modes of moral choice and modes of self-definition. Table 6 presents these findings. In this sample, regardless of sex, individuals who characterized themselves predominantly in connected terms more frequently used considerations of response in constructing and resolving real-life moral conflicts; and individuals who characterized themselves predominantly in separate/objective terms more frequently used considerations of rights. Although these results do not allow us to claim a causal relationship between modes of self-definition and modes of moral choice, we can say an important relationship exists. Further research is needed to see if these results hold over larger samples of a broader socio-economic status. Furthermore, research is needed to test the possibility that patterns of decision-making in areas other than moral choice may also be related to' these modes of self-definition.
Implications
The development of the methodologies presented here -the coding schemes for identifying modes of self-definition and moral judgment -made possible the testing of a set of hypotheses important for theories of ego and moral development and for educational and clinical practice as well. Although all of the implications cannot be addressed fully, some of the most important ones are identified as an invitation to others to join in further clarification.
1. Psychological theories of moral development should recognize a morality of care as a systematic, lifelong concern of individuals. It should not be identified solely as a temporary, stage -or level-specific concern, or as subsumed within a morality of justice, as Kohlberg's work posits. 2. Psychological theories of ego and identity development need to consider a relational conception-the self-in-relation-to-others -as central to self-definition. This concern for connection to others should not be considered as present only at particular stages or as issues pertaining only to women. Although men and women tend to un-derstand and define relationships in different ways, definition of self in relation to others is found in both sexes at all ages.
4. Theories of cognitive and social development should recognize that individuals construct, resolve, and evaluate problems in distinctively different ways. These differences are not simply in content, but seem to be related to two different perspectives towards others. Theories of cognitive and social development built on unitary models of social perspective-taking should be reconsidered.
5. Counselors, teachers, and managers, when dealing with conflicts within relationships, need to take into account that the language of morality in everyday speech has different meanings for people and that these may carry behavioral implications. For example, .what people feel obliged to do or what their responsibilities to others are may be defined and understood differently.
6. Designs for psychological research need to reflect in their subjects of study the 'centrality of interpersonal interactions. This means research should focus not just on the' individual but on both members of an interacting unit -husband and wife, friends, mother and child, teacher and student, manager and staff, and so forth.
7. Sex as a variable for study ought to be included in research designs and methodologies as a matter of course. This paper suggests both the difficulty in understanding sex differences and their importance to an improved understanding of theory and practice.
To accommodate the problems of modem moral philosophy, Murdoch (1970) has called for psychology and philosophy to join in creating a "new working philosophical psychology" (p. 46). This paper offers to psychologists and philosophers alike some new premises and methodologies by which to explore further the meaning of morality in our lives.
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